The Three Levels of Warfare

In contemporary military science, there are three commonly recognized “levels” of warfare and troop deployment: Tactical, Operational and Strategic. Here we will attempt to briefly outline these three levels, as some of the tactics described on this site have different meanings depending on the level they are deployed at.

The tactical level is the one in which maneuvers, engagements and battles are conducted on the battlefield. Here is where individual troops and small units up through to the divisional level engage enemy forces. It is a short-term dimension of warfare ranging from several hours through several weeks.

The next level up is the operational level, which is where, as the name suggests, operations and campaigns (which consist of a series of multiple tactical engagements) are planned and organized, and where the armies engaged in such campaigns are managed.

Finally, at the top is the strategic level, which oversees the entire war that operations and campaigns are conducted in. Here is where military operations are considered in the wider context of geopolitics and long-term state policy.

Another chart outlining the three levels.

These three levels are inter-dependent. Strategic policy informs operational considerations, which in turn provide a rough outline of the tactics needed for individual engagements. Meanwhile, the reality of the battlefield as experienced through leaders on the tactical level may also inform operational & strategic considerations.

However, these levels are at the same time independent. A string of losses on that tactical level may not affect the operation, and even an operation loss may not harm the state on the strategic level. The opposite is also true: A string of glorious tactical or operational victories may not be enough to prevent a crushing long-term defeat.

To get a better idea of the different ways these things may play out, and the inter-relational mechanics of the three levels, refer to the following examples:

One example of a long-term strategic defeat despite short-term tactical & operational success would be Project Chanology. Here, Anonymous triumphed over the Scientologists numerous times, both during online skirmishes and a series of in-person protests. The operational goals (disseminating copyrighted materials that the Scilons tried to censor, publicizing the crimes of the Church, and sharing the stories of its victims) were achieved. However, as Anonymous had no long-term strategic vision beyond the propagation of 'lulz,' the Scilons were able to thoroughly infiltrate Anonymous over a long period of time, ensuring no such operation would happen again. Several veterans of Anonymous would even come to start cybercults of their own, modeled after the Church of Scientology.

This same situation repeated itself with Occupy Wall Street. Again, a series of short-term victories were achieved over the target, and the operation (drawing attention to the corruption and misdeeds of the American financial elite) was a major success that influenced activists and journalists for years to come. However, once again Anonymous failed to secure its future on the strategic layer, leaving it open for pillaging by the agents of Wall Street and the federal government. These parties, who proceeded to remake Anonymous in their own image, triumphed on the strategic layer due to their foresight and planning.

Both of these strategic defeats were disastrous for Anonymous, as many of its members were doxxed and sold upriver by the collective's vastly more experienced enemies. The long-term health of the community suffered as well, as the culture of the collective was reshaped for the express purpose of political campaigns and state-sponsored agitprop.

A similar fate played itself out with Nazi Germany in World War II. Despite a long string of victories on the tactical level, a lack of foresight (exacerbated by a significant amount of methamphetamines) resulted in Germany being utterly clobbered on the strategic level. The opposite played out for the Soviet Union: Many losses on the tactical and operational levels at first, (including the temporary loss of much territory), only for the Soviets to emerge victorious on the strategic level as they regained their lost territory, in addition to new territories.

Pictured: A diagram outlining a 6-level model combined with a parallel “Institutional” level.

The concept of “three levels” is not a universal science, but rather a way of looking at things. The idea began development in the early 19th century with Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz, who identified only two levels - tactical and strategic. Red Army officer Alexander Svechin proposed the operational level to cover the middle ground between strategic & tactical, an idea which would be expanded upon by the Soviets and ultimately adopted by the US military in the 1980's.

There are several other models built upon the Clausewitz-Svechin model. Some propose five or six levels, further breaking things down. Others propose a parallel “institutional” level, which is where warfighting capabilities (science, technology, education, etc) are developed. See diagram for more details.

• Levels of War: Just a Set of Labels? by Martin Dunn, Chief Research Officer - Australian Directorate of Army Research and Analysis¹⁾
• The Levels of War as Levels of Analysis by Andrew S. Harvey PhD, Military Review Nov-Dec 2021, Army University Press²⁾